

Message Text

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USDEL MBFR VIENNA

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LIMDIS

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PARM, NATO

SUBJECT: MBFR: INTRODUCTION OF OPTION 3

REF: VIENNA 105

1. MISSION BELIEVES THAT, IF WASHINGTON DESIRES TO TAKE EARLY ACTION ON INTRODUCTION OF A NUCLEAR OPTION IN NEGOTIATIONS, IMPLICIT RESERVATIONS IN UK AND FRG THINKING WILL NEED TO BE ADDRESSED. WHILE FRG AND UK ARE OBVIOUSLY MAJOR ACTORS IN THIS, AS WELL AS MANY OTHER ASPECTS OF MBFR, WE ARE ALSO CERTAIN THAT OTHER ALLIES ARE EQUALLY APPREHENSIVE OF THE IMPLICATIONS OF INTRODUCING THE NUCLEAR OPTION IN PHASE 1. INFORMAL DISCUSSIONS WE HAVE PERIODICALLY HELD WITH BELGIANS, DUTCH AND TURKS MAKE IT CLEAR THAT THE SMALLER AND LESS DIRECTLY INVOLVED ALLIES REMAIN HIGHLY SKEPTICAL OF THE BENEFITS WHICH AN INTRODUCTION OF THE NUCLEAR OPTION AT THIS TIME WOULD GENERATE. THEY WILL BE ESPECIALLY CONCERNED AS TO HOW ITS INTRODUCTION CAN INFLUENCE THE
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SUBSTANTIVE DIRECTIONS NEGOTIATIONS MIGHT THEREAFTER TAKE, AS WELL AS THE MANNER IN WHICH THE ALLIANCE'S POST-MBFR SECURITY POSTURE CAN BE EFFECTIVELY MAINTAINED.

2. WE ALSO AGREE WITH USDEL MBFR THAT BEFORE ANY INITIATIVE TO INTRODUCE A NUCLEAR PROPOSAL FOR ALLIED CONSIDERATION IS TAKEN, THE USG SHOULD EXAMINE SYSTEMATICALLY, AND BE ABLE TO DEFEND WITH INTERNALLY CONSISTENT, AND EXPLICITLY OBJECTIVE-ORIENTED ARGUMENTS:

A) OUR PURPOSE IN PUTTING FORWARD ANY NUCLEAR OPTION AT THIS TIME;

B) THE PROSPECTS FOR REAPING TACTICAL ADVANTAGE IN PUTTING IT FORWARD DURING PHASE I;

C) THE LIMITS WHICH WE ESTABLISH IN ORDER TO PREVENT THE NUCLEAR OPTION FROM OPENING UP NEW SOVIET DEMANDS UNRELATED TO THE SPECIFIC ALLIED NEGOTIATING PROPOSAL; (E.G., ENABLING SOVIETS TO PURSUE THEIR OBJECTIVE OF ESTABLISHING CEILINGS ON OTHER "EQUIPMENTS.")

D) THE TACTICAL APPROACHES WE RECOMMEND FOR INTRODUCING THE OPTION.

3. WHILE WE CANNOT SPECIFICALLY COMMENT ON THE TACTICAL NEGOTIATING SITUATION FROM HERE, IT IS CLEAR TO US THAT THERE WILL BE ALLIED RESERVATIONS ON EITHER AN AGREED NUCLEAR PACKAGE, AND/OR A MANUAL FOR

ITS USE, IF THE ALLIES HAVE NOT BEEN THOROUGHLY, AND OF COURSE, CAREFULLY CONSULTED ON THE MATTER IN BRUSSELS. TRILATERAL DISCUSSIONS WITH THE UK AND FRG MAY WELL HELP MATTERS ALONG, BUT THEY CANNOT IN ANY SENSE BE REGARDED AS A SUBSTITUTE FOR A FULL ALLIANCE CONSULTATION.

4. WE THINK THAT WASHINGTON SHOULD CONSIDER THE FOLLOWING AS ESSENTIAL IN ANY FORMAL APPROACH THE US WOULD MAKE TO THE ALLIES.

A) FORUM. IN ORDER TO UNDERScore SENSITIVITY OF SUBJECT, WE THINK THAT CONSULTATIONS ON THE NUCLEAR OPTION SHOULD TAKE PLACE EITHER IN RESTRICTED COUNCIL OR PERHAPS IN PRIVATE NAC SESSIONS IN SYG'S CONFERENCE ROOM. THIS WOULD PROVIDE THE
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SUITABLE FRAME OF CONFIDENTIALITY, AND WOULD TEND TO INHIBIT ALLIES FROM PROPOSING THAT OTHER NATO BODIES ENGAGE IN THE PROCESS. WHILE WE WOULD OF COURSE PREFER TO LIMIT CONSULTATION TO ONE SESSION THIS IS NOT LIKELY TO BE FEASIBLE. WE SHOULD THEREFORE NOT OPPOSE ITS EXTENSION BUT WOULD INSURE THAT ALLIES DO NOT GET IDEA THAT PROCESS WOULD BE IN ANY WAY OPEN ENDED.

B) SCENARIO. WE THINK AN INTRODUCTORY RATIONALE SHOULD BE AVAILABLE WHICH WOULD EXPLAIN WHY THE US THINKS THE AHG SHOULD MAKE USE OF THE NUCLEAR OPTION IN THE NEAR FUTURE. MANY OF USDEL MBFR'S COMMENTS IN REFTEL WOULD APPEAR TO PERTAIN.

C) STATEMENT OF OBJECTIVES. ANY SUBSTANTIVE PRESENTATION TO THE ALLIES SHOULD STATE EXPLICITLY OUR NEGOTIATING OBJECTIVES. IT

SHOULD SHOW TO WHAT EXTENT OUR PROPOSALS FOR INTRODUCING A NUCLEAR OPTION WILL MESH WITH THE CURRENT ALLIED NEGOTIATING POSITION, BUT SHOULD ALSO SERVE TO REASSURE ALLIES ON THEIR IMPACT FOR POST-MBFR ALLIANCE DEFENSE CAPABILITIES.

D) CONTINGENCY POINTS. A CONTINGENCY SET OF ARGUMENTS SHOULD BE ON HAND TO ALLAY WIDESPREAD, ALTHOUGH AT THIS POINT GENERALLY WELL KNOWN ALLIES FEARS ON THE IMPLICATIONS OF PUTTING FORWARD A NUCLEAR OPTION.

5. IN GENERAL, THE MORE FORTHCOMING AND REASSURING WE CAN BE, EITHER IN OUR FORMAL PRESENTATION OR DURING A QUESTION-AND-ANSWER PERIOD, ON ISSUES OF CONCERN TO THE ALLIES, THE MORE LIKELY WILL BE A RELATIVELY RAPID ALLIED AGREEMENT.
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